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JUDICIAL LEGITIMATION IN CHINA 
 
Benjamin Minhao Chen* 
Zhiyu Li** 
 
 
China’s judiciary is becoming increasingly professionalized, and its 
courts are enjoying a degree of autonomy they have not enjoyed since the 
Revolution. By promulgating abstract interpretations of the code and 
through the selective publication of cases, Chinese judicial institutions 
today function as policymaking bodies on both national and local scales. 
But are they able to legitimize social policy? This question has received 
little attention from legal scholars, but its answer is important for our 
understanding of the judicial role in the governance of modern China.  
We field a survey experiment that seeks to measure the persuasiveness 
of courts vis-à-vis administrative and non-regulatory actors. We find that 
courts are sometimes able to induce support for the policies they endorse. 
We also find, however, that this ability is not unique to courts and is at least 
equaled by administrative bodies.  
Our results have profound implications for the future of judicialization 
in China. They illuminate the potential of litigation as a tool for fostering 
social change. But they also explain why the regime does not rely on 
judicial institutions to convince the public of the rightness of government 
policy: other governmental entities are as persuasive as courts, if not more 
so. More broadly, the empirical findings presented here suggest that while 
the Chinese party-state might find it advantageous to operate through law, 
it does not necessarily have to govern through courts.  
                                                 
* Associate-in-Law and Lecturer-in-Law, Columbia Law School; Ph.D. (U.C. 
Berkeley). 
** Assistant Professor in Chinese Law and Co-Director of the Centre for Chinese Law 
& Policy, Durham Law School; J.S.D. (U.C. Berkeley). The authors are grateful to the 
Center for the Study for Law and Society at the University of California, Berkeley School 
of Law for generously funding this research. This Article has benefited from helpful 
comments by Ira Belkin, Jerome Cohen, John Ferejohn, Benjamin Liebman, and Mathias 
Siems, as well as participants at the Conference on Empirical Legal Studies in Asia, the 
Visiting Scholar Presentation Series at the US-Asia Law Institute at New York University, 
and the Durham Law Faculty Workshop. All errors remain ours. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Courts have emerged as vital policymaking bodies of the People’s 
Republic. They do not only adjudicate individual cases; they also operate as 
quasi-legislative bodies by promulgating interpretations touching on a wide 
range of fields and subjects. These judicial interpretations—issued in the 
absence of a live case or controversy—have come to acquire the force of 
law despite their initial lack of a constitutional or statutory basis. In some 
instances, they do not merely elaborate the code but also supplement it. 
Besides formulating abstract rules, courts also shape policy through the 
selective publication of cases. Although cases are not a formal source of law 
in China, those carrying the approbation of a superior court tend to be 
followed by the inferior tribunals in its jurisdiction. Because opinions speak 
in the specialized language of the law, the transmission of policy through 
cases shields judicial decisions from political interference.1  
These developments have magnified the influence of courts over the 
Chinese administrative regulatory state, none more so than the Supreme 
People’s Court (SPC). The “transformation of the [SPC] from a state 
security agency into a relatively autonomous policy-making organization”2 
has kindled hopes that it can become an advocate for reform within the 
                                                 
1 Björn Ahl, Judicialization in Authoritarian Regimes: The Expansion of Powers of the 
Chinese Supreme People’s Court, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(forthcoming), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3118847; 
Björn Ahl, Retaining Judicial Professionalism: The New Guiding Cases Mechanism of the 
Supreme People’s Court, 217 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 121 (2014). 
2  Eric C. Ip, The Supreme People’s Court and the Political Economy of Judicial 
Empowerment in Contemporary China, 24 COLUM. J. ASIAN. L. 367, 367 (2011). 
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Chinese state. The more extravagant of these hopes is that the SPC might 
become a vector for introducing liberal notions of rule of law and 
constitutional governance into China. But sober-eyed observers emphasize 
that the SPC is not independent of the government and is, ultimately, 
subordinate to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). While the legislature 
may have acquiesced in the Court’s interstitial law-making, ideas that 
undermine the Party’s doctrine or its continued rule will not be 
countenanced. 
Critical to assessing the institutional capacity of the judiciary is its sway 
over the masses. The persuasiveness of judicial institutions bears on the 
amount of support they can muster for their positions. It also matters for 
their standing vis-à-vis other state organs: the party-state is more likely to 
indulge judicial policymaking if doing so serves to legitimize the regime. 
This article offers some of the first causal evidence on the ability of courts 
to move public opinion in China. Part I of the article motivates the survey 
experiment by elucidating the policymaking function of courts, focusing in 
particular on the SPC. Part II provides some theoretical background on 
persuasion and discusses relevant findings from the comparative literature. 
Part III describes the design of the survey experiment and analyzes its 
results. Part IV draws out some of the implications of the empirical findings 
for judicialization in China, a theme that encompasses, for instance, the 
institutional design of constitutional review and the promise of public 
interest litigation as a tool for combatting harmful social practices. Part V 
concludes. 
 
II. JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING IN CHINA 
 
Studies of authoritarian courts suggest that they do more than dispense 
justice between private citizens. They also legitimize official policy by 
lending them an aura of fairness and objectivity.3 Judicial institutions are 
able to engender acquiescence, even agreement, because they are perceived 
as being fundamentally different from other state organs. Symbols articulate 
and reinforce this understanding of judicial authority.4 The emblem of the 
SPC features the scales of justice. Similarly, the “monumentality” of 
                                                 
3 Pierre Landry, The Institutional Diffusion of Courts in China: Evidence from Survey 
Data, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 207, 207 
(Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds. 2008). It is important to distinguish between 
legitimacy derived from the performance of a government function, the resolution of 
private disputes being one particular example, see Susan H. Whiting, Authoritarian “Rule 
of Law” and Regime Legitimacy, 50 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES 1907 (2017), and 
the legitimization of policy through the courts. We refer here to the latter. 
4 James L. Gibson et al., Losing, but Accepting: Legitimacy, Positivity Theory, and the 
Symbols of Judicial Authority, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 837 (2014). 
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provincial courthouses impresses on viewers the status of the judiciary and 
its mandate to act as a neutral arbiter and “check . . . other state organs.”5 
The persuasiveness of judicial institutions is an especially interesting 
question in the Chinese context where courts exercise both adjudicative and 
quasi-legislative functions. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
China vests legislative power in the National People’s Congress (NPC) and 
NPC’s Standing Committee.6 A law passed by the NPC may, however, be 
interpreted by several bodies. Legislative interpretations are promulgated by 
the Standing Committee of the NPC in order to elucidate the law “[i]n cases 
where the[ir] limits . . . need to be further defined or additional stipulations 
need to be made.” 7  Judicial interpretations are issued by the SPC in 
response to “questions involving the specific application of laws and 
decrees in court trials.”8 The Chinese Supreme People’s Procuratorate also 
interprets questions of law arising in the course of its duties.9 Finally, other 
issues regarding the application or implementation of laws are addressed by 
the State Council and the relevant ministries through administrative 
interpretations.10  
A judicial interpretation by the SPC takes one of four forms: 
“interpretation,” “provision,” “reply,” and “decision.”11 An “interpretation” 
addresses the specific application of a law for purposes of adjudication, and 
explains how the law should be applied to a particular type of case or issue.  
A “provision” formulates norms or opinions essential to the task of 
adjudication by drawing on the spirit of the law. A “reply” is furnished by 
the SPC in response to requests by a High People’s Court or a military court 
of the People’s Liberation Army for clarifications on a particular legal 
question. Finally the SPC amends or abrogates its prior judicial 
                                                 
5 Björn Ahl & Hendrik Tieben, Modern Chinese Court Buildings, Regime Legitimacy 
and the Public, 28 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW 603, 629 (2015). 
6 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa (1982) (中华人民共和国宪法) [Constitution 
of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the National People’s Congress on 
Dec. 4, 1982, effective on Dec. 4, 1982), art. 58. 
7 Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Jiaqiang Falv Jieshi 
Gongzuo de Jueyi (全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于加强法律解释工作的决议 ) 
[Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Providing an 
Improved Interpretation of the Law] (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress, June 10, 1981, effective on June 10, 1981), art.1, available at 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display. aspx?cgid=1006&lib=law.  
8 Id. art. 2. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. art. 3. 
11 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Sifa Jieshi Gongzuo de Guiding (最高人民法院关
于司法解释工作的规定) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Judicial 
Interpretation Work] (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court on Mar. 9, 2007, 
effective on Apr. 1, 2007), art. 6.  
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interpretations through “decisions.” The proliferation of judicial 
interpretations has elevated the SPC from an agency that merely 
implements the diktats of the state—and the Party—to a substantive 
policymaking body.12  
One of the most notorious judicial interpretations in recent history 
issued in 2001, in Qi Yuling v. Chen Xiaoqi,13 a case many commentators 
dubbed China’s Marbury.14 Qi Yuling and Chen Xiaoqi graduated from the 
same middle school in 1990. Chen did not qualify to take the national 
entrance examination after failing the preliminary examination. Qi, on the 
other hand, sat for the national entrance examination and achieved a score 
that made her eligible for an employer-sponsored education. However, Qi 
never received her examination results. Her offer of admission from a 
commerce school was mistakenly delivered to Chen by the middle school. 
Chen appropriated Qi’s offer and procured fabricated documents to attend 
the commerce school under Qi’s name. Chen eventually secured 
employment at a bank. After the fraud came to light, Qi filed suit alleging 
violations of her right to her name as well as her right to education. A key 
issue in Qi’s claim for damages concerned the legal status of the latter right. 
If the right to education were not vindicable at law, then Qi could only be 
awarded damages for emotional distress and not for economic loss. Because 
the General Principles of the Civil Law did not expressly articulate a private 
right to education, the lower courts sought the SPC’s guidance on the issue. 
The SPC held that Qi had a constitutional right to education and that the 
violation of that right gave rise to civil liability. As Huang Songyou, then-
Vice President of the SPC, later explained: 
Previously the Supreme People’s Court issued very few replies 
concerning cases of indirect application of the Constitution. 
However the issues in Qi Yuling concerned violations of citizens’ 
constitutional rights, as well as rights provided in laws such as the 
                                                 
12 Ip, supra note 2. 
13 Qi Yuling Su Chen Xiaoqi Deng Yi Qinfan Xingmingquan de Shouduan Qinfan 
Xianfa Baohu de Gongmin Shoujiaoyu de Jibenquanli Jiufen An (齐玉苓诉陈晓琪等以侵
犯姓名权的手段侵犯宪法保护的公民受教育的基本权利纠纷案) [Qi Yuling v. Chen 
Xiaoqi et al.(2001)].  
14 Huang Zhengdong, Feizhi Qiyuling An Pifu yu Xianfa Shiyong zhi Guanlian (废止
齐玉苓案与宪法适用之关联) [The Connection between the Abolishment of the Reply of 
the Qiyuling Case and the Application of the Constitution], 4 Faxue [Legal Science] 3, 3-
10 (2009); Robert J. Morris, China’s Marbury: Qi Yuling v. Chen Xiaoqi—The Once and 
Future Trial of Both Education & Constitutionalization, 2 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 273 
(2010); see also Tong Zhiwei, Xianfa Shiyong ying Yixun Xianfa Benshen Guiding de 
Lujing (宪法适用应依循宪法本身规定的路径) [The Constitutional Application Should 
Follow the Route Provided for by the Constitution], 6 ZHONGGUO FAXUE (中国法学) 
[CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE] 22, 22-48 (2008). 
6 DRAFT [17-Dec-19 
General Principles of the Civil Law. In the Reply to the principal 
case, Qi’s right to receive education is a right difficult for civil law 
theory to cover and is obviously one of the fundamental rights 
provided by the Constitution. Had we not directly applied the 
Constitutional provisions, it would have been hard to provide 
judicial remedies. Apparently, the Reply established a precedent 
for the justiciability of the Constitution in China.15 
 
The SPC’s Reply excited controversy because constitutional disputes were 
generally understood to be beyond the court’s jurisdiction. Article 62 of the 
Constitution grants the NPC the “power to supervise the enforcement of the 
Constitution” while Article 67 vests in the NPC’s Standing Committee the 
“power to interpret the Constitution and supervise its enforcement” Some 
scholars thus perceived the Reply as an arrogation of the power to interpret 
the constitution or even exercise constitutional review.16 Others, however, 
disagreed. Zhang Qianfan, a law professor at Peking University, suggested 
that the Reply should be read narrowly, and that the Constitution should be 
invoked only where no remedy is otherwise available or if the applicable 
laws conflict. 17  Wang Zhenmin of Tsinghua University went further, 
arguing that “[t]he Constitution itself contains no clause manifestly 
prohibiting its application in litigation.” 18  While the Reply was short-
lived—the SPC abolished it in 2007 as “no longer applicable”—Qi Yuling 
illustrates the potential for the SPC to assert itself institutionally through 
judicial interpretation.  
The SPC also promulgates judicial interpretations to implement 
legislation or to adapt the code to social, economic, and technological 
change. Although there was initially no legal foundation for the SPC’s 
authority to engage in abstract rule-making absent a controversy, the NPC 
silently acquiesced in SPC’s practice of doing so and eventually authorized 
it.19  “[T]he SPC has [consequently] become a third legislative actor on the 
                                                 
15 Huang Songyou, Xianfa Sifahua Jiqi Yiyi (宪法司法化及其意义) [The Justiciability 
of the Constitution and Its Meaning], Renmin Fayuan Bao (人民法院报) [China Court], 
Aug. 13, 2001. 
16 Zhiwei Tong, A Comment on the Rise and Fall of the Supreme People’s Court’s 
Reply to Qi Yuling’s Case, 43 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 101 (2010). 
17 Zhang Qianfan, Lun Xianfa Xiaoli De Jieding Jiqi Dui Sifa De Yingxiang (论宪法效
力的界定及其对司法的影响) [On the Demarcation of Legal Effects of the Constitution 
and Its Influence over Private Law]. 2 Bijiaofa Yanjiu [Journal of Comparative Law] 1, 17-
18 (2004). 
18 Wang Zhenmin, Woguo Xianfa Kefou Jinru Susong (我国宪法可否进入诉讼) 
[Does Chinese Constitution Have Access to Litigation], 5 Fashang Yanjiu (法商研究) 
[Studies in Law and Business] 28, 28 (1999).  
19 The SPC in abstract rule-making eve before the NPC officially granted the SPC the 
power to issue judicial interpretations in 1981. See Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui 
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national level in addition to the NPC and the State Council and its quasi-
legislative acts, in general, take precedence over other legislation.”20 An 
example of such quasi-legislation is an interpretation issued by the SPC in 
September 2013 regarding defamation and the disruption of social order 
through information networks (or, colloquially, fake news). 21  Several 
months before the interpretation was issued, the Chinese Administration of 
Public Security executed a national crackdown on internet-related crimes or 
qingwang xingdong (清网行动 ) and arrested several social media 
personalities. Article 246 of the Criminal Law states that: 
 
Those openly insulting others using force or other methods or 
those fabricating stories to slander others, if the case is serious, are 
to be sentenced to three years or fewer in prison, put under 
criminal detention or surveillance, or deprived of their political 
rights. 
 
Those committing crimes mentioned above are to be investigated 
only if they are sued, with the exception of cases that seriously 
undermine social order or the state’s interests. 
 
The SPC clarified that the fabrication and dissemination of false 
information through the internet resulting in damage to another person’s 
reputation is punishable as defamation under Article 246. Furthermore, 
defamatory social media posts that have been clicked or viewed more than 
5,000 times, or forwarded more than 500 times, are deemed serious enough 
                                                                                                                            
Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Jiaqiang Falv Jieshi Gongzuo de Jueyi, supra note 11; see 
also, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan 1955nian Yilai Jianyin Younv Anjian Jiancha Zongjie (最高
人民法院 1955 年以来奸淫幼女案件检查总结 ) [Summary of the Inspection of 
Fornication with Underage Girls Cases Decided Since 1955] (promulgated by the SPC on 
Apr. 30, 1957, effective Apr. 30, 1957). Zhou Jue, Jianguo Chuqi Xingshi Shenpan 
Gongzuo De Huiyi (建国初期刑事审判工作的回忆 ) [Memories about Criminal 
Adjudication Work in the Early Days of the Establishment of the Country], Zhongguo 
Fayuan Wang ( 中 国 法 院 网 ) [China Court Net], Sep. 29, 2007, 
https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2007/09/id/268326.shtml (last visited on Feb. 15, 
2019). 
20 Ahl, Judicialization in Authoritarian Regimes, supra note 1, at 20. 
21 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan Guanyu Banli Liyong Xinxi 
Wangluo Shishi Feibang Deng Xingshi Anjian Shiyong Falv Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi  (最
高人民法院、最高人民检察院关于办理利用信息网络实施诽谤等刑事案件适用法律
若干问题的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate on Several Issues concerning the Specific Application of Law in the 
Handling of Defamation through Information Networks and Other Criminal Cases] 
(promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on 
Sep. 6, 2013, effective on Sep. 10, 2013). 
8 DRAFT [17-Dec-19 
to subject the offender to a maximum of three years imprisonment. These 
cases are to be taken up only on complaint, unless the social media 
publications at issue grievously injure social order or the national interest 
by, for example, inciting a mass incident or fomenting ethical or religious 
strive. The SPC also made Article 293 of the Criminal Law applicable to 
fake news. Article 293 prescribes a sentence of “not more than five years of 
fixed-term imprisonment, criminal detention, or control” for those whose 
“provocative and disturbing behavior . . . creat[e] a disturbance in a public 
place, causing serious disorder.” Posting or spreading false information 
online, the SPC declared, constituted such an offense.22  
This interpretation became the subject of intense public debate in 2014 
after a prominent Chinese blogger, Qin Zhihui, was sentenced to three years 
in jail for defamation and causing trouble by spreading rumors on Weibo 
between 2010 and 2013. Qin, a Weibo celebrity, was alleged to have 
published over 3,000 libelous tweets attacking public figures or 
governmental authorities.23 These tweets were shared thousands of times by 
his followers and his followers’ followers.24 One of Qin’s most contentious 
tweets accused the Railway Ministry of paying 30 million euros to a foreign 
passenger who died in a 23 July, 2011, Wenzhou train collision so as to 
mollify her bereaved family.25 Another tweet claimed that the story of Lei 
Feng—a soldier lionized by the CCP as a paragon of modesty and 
selflessness—was purely apocryphal.26  And yet another tweet suggested 
that Chinese civil servants were being forced to donate to the Red Cross in 
order to cultivate a charitable national image.27 Qin’s case was the first to 
be tried publicly since China began its qingwang xingdong.28 At trial, Qin 
                                                 
22 Article 293 of the Criminal Law provides that “Whoever undermines public order 
with any one of the following provocative and disturbing behaviors is to be sentenced to 
not more than five years of fixed-term imprisonment, criminal detention, or control: ... (4) 
creating a disturbance in a public place, causing serious disorder.” Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Xingfa 1997 Xiuding (中华人民共和国刑法(1997 修订)) [Criminal Law of 
the People’s Republic of China (97 Revision)] (promulgated by the National People’s 
Congress on Oct. 1, 1997, effective on Mar. 14, 1997), art. 293. 
23 Dong Jianing, Qin Huohuo Feibang, Xunxin Zishi An Jiangyu 4yue 11ri Kaiting 
Beijing Chaoyang Fayuan Weibo Zhibo (“秦火火”诽谤、寻衅滋事案将于 4月 11日开
庭 北京朝阳法院微博直播) [Qin Huohuo Defamation and Causing Trouble Case Will Be 
Heard on Apr. 11 Beijing Caoyang People’s Court Streaming the Trial on Weibo], Guan 
Cha Zhe ( 观 察 者 ) [Observer], Apr. 8, 2014, 
https://www.guancha.cn/FaZhi/2014_04_08_220416.shtml (last visited on February 14, 
2019). 
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Liu Yang, Qin Huohuo Xi Woguo Diyige Huoxing De Wangluo Zaoyao Zhe(“秦火
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apologized for his misdeeds and cautioned others against committing the 
same mistakes.29  
The implications of the SPC’s position for freedom of speech provoked 
consternation in some quarters of the Chinese legal community. Zhu Wei, a 
law don at the China University of Political Science and Law, praised the 
high court’s interpretation for preventing the virtual space from becoming a 
hotbed for internet-related crimes.30 In contrast, Ma Changshan of the East 
China University of Political Science and Law, questioned the legal 
definition and scope of the term “public places.” He contended that the 
internet should not be treated like the physical spaces where people toil, 
study, socialize, and recreate. 31  A Beijing lawyer also criticized the 
interpretation. Pointing out that followers and retweets on social networks 
can be purchased from public relations firms, he said, “[f]rom now on, 
whenever anyone says anything bad about me, I will just get zombie 
followers to view their post 5,000 times or repost it 500 times and get them 
sent to prison.”32 While the SPC’s September 2013 interpretation clamping 
down on fake news is especially salient, judicial interpretations are not a 
recent phenomenon. Between 1998 and 2009, the SPC issued 264 publicly 
accessible and legally binding judicial interpretations, touching on fields 
spanning corporate law to family law and subjects ranging from 
international trade to environmental pollution. 33  The SPC’s judicial 
interpretations pervade Chinese law and policy, so much so that were they 
                                                                                                                            
火” 系我国第一个获刑的网络造谣者) [Qin Huohuo is China’s First Defamer on the 
Internet Who Has Ben Sentenced], Souhu Xinwen (搜狐新闻) [Sohu News], Apr. 18, 2014, 
news.sohu.com/20140418/n398427491.shtml,(last visited on Feb. 14, 2019) 
29  Ma Junqin, “Qin Huohuo” Dangting Xiang Yanglan Dengren Daoqian Ziyuan 
Renzui [“秦火火” 当庭向杨澜等人道歉 自愿认罪] (“Qin Huohuo” Apologized to Yang 
Lan and Others at Trial and Voluntarily Pleaded Guilty), Xinhua Wang (新华网) [Xinhua 
Net], Apr. 11, 2014, http://www.xinhuanet.com//photo/2014-04/11/c_126382186.htm (last 
visited on Feb. 13, 2019) 
30 Zhu Wei, Qinhuohuo An Dailai De Qishi yu Fansi (秦火火案带来的启示与反思) 
[The Implication and Reflection Brought by Qinhuohuo Case], Renmin Wang (人民网) 
[People.cn], Apr. 16, 2014, http://legal.people.com.cn/n/2014/0416/c42510-24900204.html 
(last visited on Feb. 11, 2019). 
31 Ma Changshan, Falv de Kongjian Chuanyue Jiqi Fengxian: Cong Lianggao Banli 
Wangluo Feibang Deng Xingshi Anjian De Sifa Jieshi Chufa (法律空间的穿越及其风
险：从两高办理网络诽谤等刑事案件的司法解释出发) [The Crossover and Risk of the 
Space of Law: From the Judicial Interpretation of the SPC and SPP handling Criminal 
Cases Concerning Internet-related Defemation]. Suzhou Daxue Xuebao (苏州大学学报) 
[Journal of Soochow Unievrsity 34, 34-41. 
32 C. Custer, In China, Tweeting Rumors Can Now Land You Three Years in Jail... or 
Worse, TECH IN ASIA (Sep. 9, 2013), https://www.techinasia.com/china-tweeting-rumors-
land-years-jailor-worse (last visited on Feb. 15, 2019). 
33 Ip, supra note 2, at 394–97.  
10 DRAFT [17-Dec-19 
to be abolished, “the legal system would grind to a halt.”34  
Besides judicial interpretations, the SPC also promulgates documents 
that are normative in nature. Exemplary cases comprise the majority of 
these documents. Since 1985, the Supreme People’s Court Gazette has 
published selected cases from courts at all levels. Chinese judicial opinions 
do not have precedential value and are not formally recognized as a source 
of law. Those approved by the SPC, however, bear its imprimatur and are 
generally followed by the lower courts. 35  Today, cases selected for 
inclusion in the Gazette reach a broader audience than judges. Since March 
2017, the SPC has made those cases available to the public through its 
website.36 In addition to Gazette, the SPC edits and compiles a series of 
“guiding cases” that lower court judges must consult (参照 ) when 
adjudicating similar matters.37 These cases span the range of legal subjects 
38 and they too are available for consultation by the public, in print and 
electronically.39  
By selecting and editing cases for publication, the SPC influences the 
practical application of statutory law and thereby shapes public policy.40 For 
example, after President Xi Jinping emphasized the “core values of 
socialism” in 2014 and urged comprehensive implementation of these moral 
                                                 
34  Randall Peerenboom, Courts as Legislators: Supreme People’s Court 
Interpretations and Procedural Reforms 3 (2007). Though the discussion thus far has 
focused exclusively on the high court, the same phenomenon has been observed at the sub-
national level. In spite of official discouragement by the SPC, local courts, too, announce 
interpretations of law and regulations that they then apply as rules of decisions to cases 
pending before them (Xi, 2012). 
35 Nanping Liu, “Judicial Review” in China: A Comparative Perspective, 14 REV. 
SOCIALIST L. 241, 246–50 (1988). 
36 These cases may be consulted at http://gongbao.court.gov.cn/. 
37 Zhidao Anli (指导案例) [Guiding Cases], Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zuigao 
Renmin Fayuan (中华人民共和国最高人民法院) [The Supreme People’s Court of the 
People’s Republic of China], http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-gengduo-77.html (last visited 
on February, 2019); Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Anli Zhidao Gongzuo De Guiding 
Shishi Xize (最高人民法院关于案例指导工作的规定〉实施细则 ) [Detailed 
Implementing Rules on the “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Work 
on Case Guidance”] (promulgated by the SPC on Apr. 27, 2015, effective on May 13, 
2015); Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Anli Zhidao Gongzuo de Guiding (最高人民法院
关于案例指导工作的规定) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Work 
on Case Guidance] (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court on Nov. 26, 2010, 
effective on Nov. 26, 2010). 
38 Zhidao Anli, supra note 37. 
39 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Anli Zhidao Gongzuo De Guiding Shishi Xize, supra 
note 37, arts. 9, 10; Mo Zhang, Pushing the Envelope: Application of Guiding Cases in 
Chinese Courts and Development of Case Law in China, 26 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 269, 
272-73 (2017). 
40 Ahl, Retaining Judicial Professionalism, supra note 1. 
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doctrines nationwide, the SPC designated twenty local judicial decisions as 
exemplary cases upholding such values as honesty and trustworthiness, 
public order and good custom, and family virtues.41  
In sum, by issuing judicial interpretations and designating selected cases 
as models to be emulated by the lower courts, the SPC refines and even 
revises statutory law. As a de facto, if not de jure, policymaking body, the 
SPC exercises its quasi-legislative powers broadly and not merely 
interstitially. “[I]t competes with other state organs in legislating directly 
vis-à-vis legal subjects.”42 At the same time, it is legally and politically 
subordinate to the NPC and, ultimately, the Party. While the SPC strives to 
promote its own agenda and interests, 43  it also serves the party-state, 
employing its expertise to develop and advance national objectives.44 The 
tension between these two pursuits is not an irreconcilable one: the 
autonomy enjoyed by the SPC depends, in part, on its ability to legitimize 
policy.45 The greater its influence on public opinion in China, the more 
useful the SPC becomes to the party-state, and the likelier it is for other 
political actors to indulge or at least tolerate its assertiveness in domains 
removed from the regime’s core interests.46 The persuasiveness of the SPC 
                                                 
41 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbu 10qi Hongyang Shehui Zhuyi Hexin Jiazhi Guan 
Dianxing Anli (最高人民法院公布十起弘扬社会主义核心价值观典型案例) [Ten Model 
Cases regarding Upholding the Socialist Core Values Issued by the Supreme People’s 
Court] (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court on Aug. 22, 2016, effective on Aug. 
22, 2016); Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbu 10qi Hongyang Shehui Zhuyi Hexin Jiazhi 
Guan Dianxing Anli (最高人民法院公布 10起弘扬社会主义核心价值观典型案例) [Ten 
Model Cases regarding Upholding the Socialist Core Values Issued by the Supreme 
People’s Court] (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court on Mar. 8, 2016, effective on 
Mar. 8, 2016). 
42 Ahl, Judicialization in Authoritarian Regimes, supra note 1, at 20; see also Yanrong 
Zhao, The Way to Understand the Nature and Extent of Judicial Independence in China, 
ASIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 20 (forthcoming) (describing as an insight of the “strategic 
interaction” school of understanding judicial independence in China that “by interpreting 
the law creatively and strategically, the courts can advance their own institutional interests 
and compete in the struggle for power and legitimacy with other political actors”). 
43 Ip, supra note 2; Taisu Zhang, The Pragmatic Court: Reinterpreting the Supreme 
People’s Court of China, 25 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2012). 
44 Ling Li, The Chinese Communist Party and People’s Courts: Judicial Dependence 
in China, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 37 (2016). 
45 See Jean-Pierre Cabestan, The Political and Practical Obstacles to the Reform of the 
Judiciary and the Establishment of a Rule of Law in China, 10 JOURNAL OF CHINESE 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 43, 48 (2005) (“[T]he Chinese authorities are keen to push forward the 
establishment of a ‘rule by law’ and a professional and autonomous court system, albeit of 
‘socialist’ texture, aimed both at enhancing the regime’s political legitimacy and at 
stabilizing society and relations between state and society by opening new avenues for the 
presumably more reliable settlement of disputes.”). 
46  For an example from Egypt, see Tamir Moustafa, Law versus the State: The 
Judicialization of Politics in Egypt, 28 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 883 (2003).  
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is therefore critical to our understanding of its institutional strength and the 
future of judicially-initiated change in China.  
The discussion up to now has focused exclusively on the SPC. But 
lower courts also make rules through the same channels as those employed 
by the SPC, albeit on a more modest scale. Despite official disapproval of 
the practice, high courts in Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang have 
formulated abstract opinions to address burgeoning issues in corporate law 
and governance. 47  Some of these provisions are interstitial in character, 
providing for remedies where none were specified in the Company Law.48 
Others—such as the rules for piercing of the corporate veil and instituting a 
derivative lawsuit—appear to lack any foundation in statutory authority, 
being justified only by expedience.49 Local courts have also introduced the 
notion of stare decisis into adjudication by designating cases as having 
precedential value in their own jurisdictions. For example, as early as 2002, 
a basic people’s court in Zhongyuan, Zhengchou, implemented “a process 
whereby a holding shall be recognized as a ‘precedent’ with a certain 
degree of binding effect in the adjudication of similar cases in the future, 
which other panels and individual judges should refer to in handling similar 
cases.”50 Till today, the Tianjin City High People’s Court operates on a 
similar model. 51  Elsewhere, the Guangdong and Jiangsu High People’s 
Court regularly designate “typical cases” for consultation by judges in their 
                                                 
47 In 1987, the SPC issued a reply which disapproved of the Guangxi High People’s 
Court articulation of policies governing real estate legal issues. The SPC found such a 
practice inappropriate as local courts did not have the authority to make abstract policies. 
However, this reply was abolished by the SPC in 2013. Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu 
difang geji fayuan buyi zhiding sifa jieshi xingzhi wenjian wenti de pifu (最高人民法院关
于地方各级法院不宜制定司法解释性质文件问题的批复) [SPC Reply Concerning the 
Inappropriateness for Local Courts at Various Levels to Adopt Documents of the Nature of 
Judicial Interpretation] (promulgated by the SPC on Mar. 31, 1987, effective on Mar. 31, 
1987). Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Feizhi 1980nian 1yue 1ri zhi 1997nian 6yue 30ri 
qijian fabu de bufen sifa jieshi he sifajieshi xingzhi wenjian de jueding (最高人民法院关
于废止 1980年 1月 1日至 1997年 6月 30日期间发布的部分司法解释和司法解释性
质文件的决定) [Decision of the Supreme People’s Court on Abolishing Some Judicial 
Interpretations and Similar Documents Issued during the Period from January 1, 1980 to 
June 30, 1997] (promulgated by the SPC on Jan. 14, 2013, effective on Jan. 18, 2013). See 
Chao Xi, Local Courts as Legislators? Judicial Lawmaking by Subnational Courts in 
China, 34 Statute Law Review 39, 49. 
48 Chao Xi, Local Courts as Legislators? Judicial Lawmaking by Subnational Courts 
in China, 34 STATUTE LAW REVIEW 39, 46 (2013). 
49 Id. at 46–48, 48–50.  
50  Chris X. Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China’s Judicial Reform, 4 
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 255, 300–01  (2003); Benjamin Liebman & Tim Wu, China’s 
Network Justice, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 257, 290 (2007). 
51 Lin, supra note 50, at 302. 
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respective jurisdictions.52  
Because they exercise systematic influence over the behavior of legal 
subjects, these courts, like the SPC, are able to formulate and implement 
policies to advance their interests and those of the party-state as articulated 
by local governments. And as with the SPC, the institutional autonomy and 
strength of the lower courts vis-à-vis other government organs at the same 
level depends in no small measure on their contribution to national 
objectives, including the maintenance of stability and order.53 
 
III. THE PERSUASIVENESS OF CHINESE INSTITUTIONS 
 
A.  Theoretical Background 
 
How does legitimation happen? It might occur through acceptance or 
persuasion.54 The former involves conformance to a decision thought to be 
dubious or even wrong. The latter, on the other hand, implies a revision in 
attitude. That is, the judicial imprimatur convinces citizens of the 
correctness or rightness of the policy being endorsed. This second notion of 
legitimation—persuasion—is the subject of our study. The question that 
interests us here is whether the courts’ status as a judicial rather than 
administrative body makes it more persuasive than other organs of state. 
The persuasiveness of American courts has been the subject of extensive 
research.55 Although the evidence is mixed, several studies have concluded 
                                                 
52  See, e.g., Guangdong Gaoyuan Fabu Goujian Hexie Laodong Guanxi Shida 
Dianxing Anli (广东高院发布构建和谐劳动关系十大典型案例) [Guangdong High 
People’s Court Published Ten Typical Cases concerning Harmonious Labor Relations], 
Guangdong Fayuan Wang ( 广 东 法 院 网 ) [Guangdong Court]. 
http://www.gdcourts.gov.cn/web/content/42887-?lmdm=2002 (last visited on Feb. 12, 
2019); Jiangsu Gaoyuan Fabu Dianxing Anli 800 Yujian (江苏高院发布典型案例 800余
件) [Jiangsu High People’s Court Issued Over 800 Typical Cases], Renmin Fayuan Bao (
人民法院报 ) [People’ s Court], http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-13941.html 
(last visited on Feb. 12, 2019). 
53 Xin He, Why did they not take on the disputes? Law, power and politics in the 
decision-making of Chinese Courts, 3 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW IN CONTEXT 203, 
222 (2007) (arguing that for local courts to cultivate a degree of autonomy, they “must . . . 
first rely on, and co-operate with, administrative power in fulfilling the social control 
function required by the party-state.”). 
54 Moustafa, supra note 46. For an articulation of this distinction, see for example 
Jeffrey J. Mondak, Policy Legitimation and the Supreme Court: The Sources and Contexts 
of Legitimation, 47 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY 675, 676-679 (1994) and James L. 
Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the US Supreme Court: Conventional 
Wisdoms and Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 201, 204 (2014). 
55 Mondak, supra note 54, at 676–79; Gibson & Nelson, supra note 54, at 204. 
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that the United States Supreme Court can sway public opinion. 56  For 
example, Brandon Bartels and Diana Mutz find that “the [United States 
Supreme Court] is more influential than Congress in using its institutional 
credibility to move opinion, and it can do so fairly unconditionally, 
regardless of people’s sophistication levels, levels of issue relevant 
thinking, or the presence of issue relevant arguments.”57 At the state-level, 
courts are also sometimes “more effective than other institutions at 
increasing public support for government policies.”58 But little attention has 
hitherto been paid to the persuasiveness of courts in authoritarian regimes 
like China’s. 59  This neglect is regrettable because courts in one-party 
dominated states are also sites of political contestation and may function 
both as instruments of repression and agents of reform.  
It is possible, however, to formulate some hypotheses about the 
persuasiveness of Chinese courts based on general theories and established 
facts. Persuasion, according to the mainstream models in psychology, can 
occur through elaborative or non-elaborative processing of information.60 
                                                 
56 Valerie J. Hoekstra, The Supreme Court and Opinion Change: An Experimental 
Study of the Court's Ability to Change Opinion, 23 AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH 109 
(1995);  Rosalee A. Clawson et al., The Legitimacy-conferring Authority of the U.S. 
Supreme Court: An Experimental Design, 29 AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH 566 (2001); 
Brandon L. Bartels & Diana C. Mutz, Explaining Processes of Institutional Opinion 
Leadership, 71 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS 249 (2009); Katerina Linos & Kimberly Twist, 
The Supreme Court, the Media, and Public Opinion: Comparing Experimental and 
Observational Methods, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 223 (2016); but see Larry R. Baas & Dan 
Thomas, The Supreme Court and Policy Legitimation: Experimental Tests, 12 AMERICAN 
POLITICS RESEARCH 335 (1984); Patrick J. Egan & Jack Citrin, The Limits of Judicial 
Persuasion and the Fragility of Judicial Legitimacy (Institute of Governmental Studies 
Working Paper, 2011), available at https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2gh262w3 (claiming 
that “even among the Court’s strongest supporters … its power to shift mass opinion 
towards accepting its rulings [is] essentially nil.”).   
57 Bartel & Mutz, supra note 56, at 259. 
58 Robert J. Humes, State Courts and Policy Legitimation: An Experimental Study of 
the Ability of State Courts to Change Opinion, 42 PUBLIUS 211, 226 (2012). 
59 A notable exception to this lacuna in the literature, though not framed in these exact 
terms, is a study conducted in Russia. Vanessa A. Baird & Debra Javeline, The Persuasive 
Power of Russian Courts, 60 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY 429 (2007). Although the 
Russian courts have been timid in the face of an overbearing executive,  Vanessa Baird and 
Debra Javeline find that the Russian Supreme Court and the Russian Constitutional Court, 
like the Duma, are able to persuade the public, and all the more so if their rulings have an 
intolerant, rather than tolerant, valence. 
60  RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION: 
CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE (1986); Shelly Chaiken, 
Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of source versus message 
cues in persuasion, 39 JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 752 (1980); 
Shelly Chaiken, The Heuristic Model of Persuasion, in SOCIAL INFLUENCE: THE ONTARIO 
SYMPOSIUM VOLUME 5 3 (Mark P. Zanna et al. eds. 1987); Serena Chen & Shelly Chaiken, 
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An individual may come to hold a certain attitude after systematically 
considering all the arguments presented for and against it (elaborative) or by 
relying on heuristics such as source credibility (non-elaborative). But source 
credibility can also affect the individual’s motivation to think about the 
issue under discussion, thus activating the elaborative mode of attitudinal 
change. Credibility is therefore an important aspect of persuasiveness. 
Credibility, in this context, may be understood as a combination of 
expertise and trustworthiness.61 Research on Chinese state institutions has 
not drawn this precise distinction, focusing instead on a more capacious 
understanding of trust. Trust has been operationalized differently in the 
literature. Sometimes, citizens are asked how much they “trust” various 
government institutions.62 Other times, the question is phrased as one of 
confidence in,63 support for,64 or satisfaction with65 these institutions. Trust, 
however, is a contested concept, and is, moreover, “seldom unconditional; it 
is given to specific individuals or institutions over specific domains.”66 
These survey results are therefore difficult to interpret. For example, 
“global and generic measures” are apt to mislead if respondents “sound 
confident about central leaders in general while they only trust a small 
number of leaders.”67  
Nevertheless, there are two “stylized facts” that surface from these 
disparate studies.68 The first is that while liberal democracies have been 
experiencing a general trend of declining institutional trust since the 1960s, 
the Chinese state has historically enjoyed a relatively elevated level of trust 
                                                                                                                            
The Heuristic-Systematic Model in Its Broader Context, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 73 (Shelly Chaiken & Taacov Trope eds. 1999). 
61  Chanthika Pornpitakpan, The Persuasiveness of Source Credibility: A Critical 
Review of Five Decades’ Evidence, 34 JOURNAL OF APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 243 
(2004). 
62  Huaxing Liu & John Watson Raine, Why is There Less Public Trust in Local 
Government than in Central Government in China?, 39 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 258 (2015); Wenfang Tang & Yang Zhang, Political Trust: An 
Experimental Study, in WENFANG TANG, CHINESE POLITICAL CULTURE AND REGIME 
SUSTAINABILITY 134 (2016). 
63 World Values Survey Wave 6, 2010–14. 
64  Bruce J. Dickson et al., Generating Regime Support in Contemporary China: 
Legitimation and the Local Legitimacy Deficit, 43 MODERN CHINA 123 (2017). 
65 Ethan Michelson & Benjamin L. Read, Public Attitudes toward Official Justice in 
Beijing and Rural China, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 169, 199 (Margaret Y.K. Woo & Mary E. Gallagher eds. 2011). 
66 Margaret Levi & Laura Stoker, Political Trust and Trustworthiness, 3 ANNUAL 
REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 475, 476 (2000). 
67 Lianjiang Li, The Magnitude and Resilience of Trust in the Center: Evidence from 
Interviews with Petitioners in Beijing and a Local Survey in Rural China, 39 MODERN 
CHINA 3, 26 (2013).  
68 Dickson et al., supra note 64, at 131. 
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from its citizenry, a phenomenon that has usually been ascribed to a 
confluence of factors: its ability to deliver results, especially in relation to 
the economy, nationalist sentiment, and fears of instability.69 The second is 
that central institutions are more trusted than local ones.70  
The first generalization applies equally to judicial institutions. For 
example, 8.9% of American respondents in the World Values Survey Wave 
6 had “a great deal” of confidence in the courts. In contrast, the same 
statistic for Chinese respondents registers at 21.1% (Tables 1 and 2). As 
Jeffrey Mondak noted, however, “[t]he legitimacy-conferring ability of a 
political institution does not exist in a vacuum, because legitimacy is 
inherently comparative.”71 Although Chinese citizens trust their legal and 
political institutions more than American citizens do, the former have more 
confidence in the national government and the national legislature 72 
whereas the latter maintain greater confidence in the courts. 73  This 
difference could, perhaps, be explained by the subordination of Chinese 
courts to the overriding interests of the party-state. Although instances of 
“telephone justice” are increasingly rare, courts remain under the formal 
supervision of the political-legal committees of the CCP.74 Courts that are 
perceived as political stooges “mask nothing, legitimize nothing.” 75 
Furthermore, the Chinese court system has been described as one 
characterized by informality and discretion,76 a state of affairs that breeds 
                                                 
69 JIE CHEN, POPULAR POLITICAL SUPPORT IN URBAN CHINA (2004); Qing Yang & 
Wenfang Tang, Exploring the Sources of Institutional Trust in China: Culture, 
Mobilization, or Performance, 2 ASIAN POLITICS & POLICY 415 (2010); Andrew J. Nathan, 
China’s Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience, 14 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 6 
(2003). 
70 Liu & Raine, supra note 62; Dickson et al., supra note 64. 
71  Jeffrey J. Mondak, Perceived legitimacy of Supreme Court decisions: Three 
functions of source credibility, 12 POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 363, 365 (1990). 
72 World Values Survey, 2010-2014. 
73 Qing Yang & Wenfang Tang, Exploring the Sources of Institutional Trust in China: 
Culture, Mobilization, or Performance, 2 ASIAN POLITICS & POLICY 415, 421 (2010). 
According to Yang and Tang, the Chinese Communist Party enjoys the most amount of 
trust out of all institutions compared, with 60% of respondents trusting it “a great deal”. 
The government, public security forces, and courts register 32%, 37%, and 37% 
respectively. 
74 Li, supra note 44. 
75 E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act 263 (1975); see 
Martin Shapiro, Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF 
COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 326, 334–335 (2008). For instance, Pereira (1998, p. 
44) observed that “military justice in Brazil was not a simple ‘extension of the military-
police repressive apparatus” for “[if] that had been the case, the usefulness of military 
justice as a legitimating device for the regime would have been negligible . . . .” 
76 Margaret Y.K. Woo, Adjudication Supervision and Judicial Independence in the 
P.R.C., 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 95 (1991); Margaret Y.K. Woo, Law and Discretion in the 
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unaccountability and corruption.77  
 
 
 Courts Government in Beijing Parliament 
A great deal 21.1% 37.7% 28.8% 
Quite a lot 50.0% 46.9% 48.6% 
Not very much 15.4% 6.2% 10.4% 
None at all 2.2% 1.0% 1.2% 
No answer 5.4% 5.3% 5.4% 
Don’t know 5.9% 3.0% 5.6% 
(N) (2,300) (2,300) (2,300) 
Table 1: Confidence in Chinese Institutions World Values Survey (2012) 
 Courts Government in D.C. Parliament 
A great deal 8.9% 3.7% 1.7% 
Quite a lot 44.9% 28.9% 18.5% 
Not very much 37.6% 51.2% 57.1% 
None at all 6.5% 14.1% 19.6% 
No answer 2.1%% 2.1% 3.1% 
(N) (2,232) (2,232) (2,232) 
Table 2: Confidence in United States Institutions World Values Survey (2011) 
                                                                                                                            
Contemporary Chinese Courts, 8 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 581 (1999). 
77 Ting Gong, Dependent Judiciary and Unaccountable Judges: Judicial Corruption in 
Contemporary China, 4 THE CHINA REVIEW 2, 33 (2004); Ling Li, The “Production” of 
Corruption in China’s Courts: Judicial Politics and Decision Making in a One-Party State, 
37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 848 (2012). 
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While the theoretical and empirical relationship between trust and 
persuasiveness remains nebulous, these observations, distilled from the vast 
bodies of work on Chinese institutions, imply that while courts may have 
the ability to change attitudes, they are unlikely to be more successful than 
other governmental entities in doing so.  
 
B.  The Survey Experiment 
 
1. Design  
 
To test these hypotheses, the survey experiment canvassed opinions on 
two scenarios – the criminalization of marital rape and a restriction on 
speech – after presenting respondents with arguments against and for the 
policies respectively. It has three factors. The first factor is the type of 
institution being identified as the source of the arguments: judicial or 
administrative.78 The second factor is the level of the relevant institution: 
national or municipal. This factor permits us to distinguish the SPC from its 
less visible judicial subordinates and, in so doing, to separate persuasion 
engendered by the prestige of the apex court from persuasion induced by 
the judicial character of courts more generally. The third factor is the 
presence of a counter-argument. Research in political psychology has 
demonstrated that individuals exposed to a one-sided frame of an issue, 
rather than a two-sided frame, display reduced amounts of attitudinal 
change, 79  and the robustness of any treatment effect in the face of 
counterargument from other actors deepens our understanding of the 
relative persuasiveness of the compared institutions. 80  Together, these 
factors comprise a 2 (Judicial or Administrative) ×2 (Municipal or National) 
×2 (No Counterargument or Counterargument) factorial design. In addition, 
the experiment has two control conditions. The policy arguments in these 
conditions are attributed to a non-regulatory entity; one condition features a 
counterargument while the other does not. These control conditions enable 
us to compare the persuasiveness of Chinese judicial and administrative 
entities vis-à-vis other actors. 
In the first scenario, respondents are informed of the prevalence of 
                                                 
78 Mondak, supra note 71, at 365 (“The legitimacy-conferring ability of a political 
institution does not exist in a vacuum, because legitimacy is inherently comparative.”).. 
79 Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, A Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation 
in Competitive Elite Environments, 57 JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 99 (2007); Dennis 
Chong & James N. Druckman, Counterframing Effects, 75 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 1 (2012). 
Similar findings were also reported by a recent study on the effect of media coverage of the 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court on public opinion. See Linos & Twist, supra 
note 56.  
80 Bartel & Mutz, supra note 56. 
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marital rape in Chinese society. Depending on their random assignment to 
one condition or the other, this introduction is followed either by an appeal 
in favor of the criminalization of marital rape made by the Chinese 
Women’s Federation or no appeal at all. The respondents are then exposed 
to arguments against the criminalization of marital rape, viz. that: 
 
marital rape should, under usual circumstances, not be charged as 
a crime. This is because a husband and wife in a normal marriage 
have a right and a duty to cohabitate, and marriage itself is 
generally deemed to be a form of generalized consent to sexual 
activity. In consideration of the need to build a harmonious 
society, the evidentiary difficulties that many cases of marital rape 
encounter, and litigants’ regret over having filed a case, the 
criminalization of marital rape is not currently recommended. 
 
In the treatment conditions, these arguments are attributed to either a court 
or a public security agency, and to either the national or municipal level of 
these authorities.  In contrast, the control conditions attribute the arguments 
to a “prominent” lawyer. Finally, respondents are asked (1) if they support, 
oppose, or neither support nor oppose the criminalization of marital rape, 
and (2) the degree of their support for or opposition to the policy as 
registered on a 1 to 4 scale.  
The second scenario follows the same format. In the second scenario, 
respondents are told of a recent controversy over an essay that challenged 
the veracity of the courageous deeds of a revolutionary hero.81 The issue is 
whether the author of the essays should be subject to legal liability for 
                                                 
81 In May 2018, the NPC enacted a statute for the avowed purpose of “strengthening 
the protection of heroes and martyrs, safeguarding the public interest, upholding and 
passing on the spirit of heroes and martyrs and the spirit of patriotism, fostering and 
practicing the core values of socialism and unleashing the strong spiritual power to realize 
the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” This statute forbids 
individuals or organizations from distorting, smearing, desecrating or denying the deeds 
and spirit of heroes and martyrs, and subjects violaters to civil or criminal liability. Zuigao 
Renmin Fayuan Gongbu Siqi Baohu Yingxiong Renwu Renge Quanyi Dianxing Anli (最
高人民法院公布四起保护英雄人物人格权益典型案例) [Four Model Cases regarding 
the Protection of Heroic Figures’ Personal Rights and Interests Published by the Supreme 
People’s Court] (promulgated by the SPC on Oct. 19, 2016, effective on Oct. 19, 2016). 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yingxiong Lieshi Baohufa (中华人民共和国英雄烈士保
护法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Heroes and Martyrs] 
(promulgated by the NPC on Apr. 27, 2018, effective on May 1, 2018). See also, Peng Bo, 
Baohu Yinglie, Yi Falv De Mingyi (保护英烈，以法律的名义) [Protect Heroes and 
Martyrs on the Name of Law], Renmin Wang (人民网 ) [People.cn], June 13, 2018, 
http://legal.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0613/c42510-30053577.html (last visited on Feb. 14, 
2019). The survey experiment was conducted before the passage of this law. 
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defamation. The respondents are then given arguments in favor of legal 
liability, viz. that: 
 
heroes such as Huang Jiguang partially embody the collective 
memory of the nation, national spirit, and socialist values, and are 
an element of the social public interest; a premise of academic 
freedom and freedom of speech is that they should not harm the 
social public interest. 
 
In the treatment conditions, these arguments are attributed to either a court 
or a Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (PPRFT) agency, and to 
either the national or municipal level of these authorities.  The control 
conditions attribute the arguments to Xinhua News Agency. The scenario 
concludes with either a counterargument made by a professor of humanities 
or no counterargument at all. Similar to before, respondents are asked (1) if 
they support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose legal liability for essays 
that doubt the veracity of heroic deeds, and (2) the degree of their support 
for or opposition to the policy as registered on a 1 to 4 scale.82 
The two scenarios share one similarity. The themes addressed by 
them—marital rape and freedom of speech—were selected because of their 
interest and salience to our targeted respondents, university students. This 
feature of the scenarios and the articulation of reasons for the endorsements 
mean that any attitudinal change is likely to be the result of more 
elaborative cognitive processes.83 Any attitudinal change should therefore 
be resistant to counterargument. 
The contrast between the two scenarios lies in the type of issue under 
consideration, the direction of the endorsement, and the control condition. 
Unlike the first scenario, the second scenario has ideological freight. In 
addition, the endorsement in the first scenario counsels against the policy 
while the endorsement in the second scenario favors it. There is some 
evidence that the former kind of endorsement is more persuasive than the 
latter.84 Finally, the sourced quoted in the control for the second scenario 
has official ties to the party-state. The source quoted in the control for the 
first scenario does not. The second scenario therefore presents a more 
severe test of the persuasiveness of courts and other governmental agencies 
than the first scenario.  
                                                 
82 Though we will refer to the marital rape scenario as the “first” scenario and the 
freedom of speech scenario as the “second” scenario, the scenarios were not necessarily 
presented in that order on the survey questionnaire. The ordering of the two scenarios was 
randomized across respondents.  
83 Mondak, supra note 71; Bartel & Mutz, supra note 56. 
84 Michael D. Cobb & James H. Kuklinski, Changing Minds: Political Arguments and 
Political Persuasion, 41 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 88, 103–04 (1997). 
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The second scenario also serves as a rough and ready check on the 
validity of the survey experiment. There is a pervasive anxiety among 
researchers about the truthfulness of responses collected in authoritarian 
states, especially if the questions being asked are of a politically sensitive 
nature. Although recent experimental evidence from China suggests that 
these concerns are, perhaps, overblown,85 one could interpret any treatment 
effect as the product of fear. For example, greater opposition to the 
criminalization of marital rape after exposure to arguments from the 
Ministry of Public Security, as compared to the same arguments from a 
prominent lawyer, could be caused by a wariness of contradicting an 
official, authoritative, stance, rather than any true attitudinal change. The 
second scenario thus doubles as a safeguard against this alternative 
explanation. Suspicion is warranted if there is a large difference in 
agreement scores between the conditions in the second scenario despite the 
overtly ideological nature of the endorsed arguments. 
 
2. Sample Characteristics 
 
The instrument was fielded to 806 university students residing in two 
major cities. This sample is unrepresentative of the general populace. Under 
normal circumstances, a population sample would be ideal. But the risk of 
governmental interference in academic surveys is non-negligible, especially 
if the surveys are perceived to touch on political subjects.86 The pursuit of a 
                                                 
85 Tang & Zhang, supra note 62; Xuchuan Leu & Jie Lu, Revisiting Political Wariness 
in China’s Public Opinion Surveys: Experimental Evidence on Responses to Politically 
Sensitive Questions, 26 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 213 (2016). 
86 WENFANG TANG, PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN CHINA 39–41 (2005); 
Melanie Manion, A Survey of Survey Research on Chinese Politics: What Have We 
Learned?, in CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS: NEW SOURCES, METHODS, AND FIELD 
STRATEGIES 181, 185 (Allen Carlson et al. eds 2010); Xiaobo Lü, Ethical Challenges in 
Comparative Politics Experiments in China, in ETHICS AND EXPERIMENTS: PROBLEMS AND 
SOLUTIONS FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND POLICY PROFESSIONALS 113, 113 (Scott 
Desposato ed. 2015) (“On many occasions, scholars face ethical dilemmas between 
satisfying the scientific standards in their studies and ensuring the safety of local 
collaborators, respondents, and even scholars themselves. These issues are particularly 
salient when studying topics that are considered politically sensitive to the Chinese 
government.”); Marie-Eve Reny, Authoritarianism as a Research Constraint: Political 
Scientists in China, 97 SOC. SCI. Q. 909, 911 (2016) (“Furthermore, opinion surveys by 
foreign investigators continue to be the object of government wariness as they can be used 
to analyze the performance of local governments. The government does not prohibit 
foreign investigators from conducting opinion surveys, provided that they cover subjects 
situated within acceptable boundaries of inquiry, but it monitors closely the process 
through which those surveys are conducted.”; see also Sheena Chestnut Greitens & Rory 
Truex, Repressive Experiences among China Scholars: New Evidence from Survey Data, 
Li Cheng, The China Paradox and American Misperception, in THE UNITED STATES AND 
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nationally representative subject pool could require researchers to 
subordinate their inquiries to governmental or other quasi-official priorities. 
We therefore eschewed the population sample. This decision renders the 
experimental results less generalizable than they might otherwise be. At the 
same time, however, it enables us to offer some insight into the legitimacy 
of authoritarian courts as policymaking institutions.   
The survey experiments were administered in person. Demographic 
questions were posed at the end of these surveys. Respondents were also 
quizzed on their knowledge of Chinese political and legal institutions. This 
quiz comprised of six multiple-choice questions of varying difficulty levels. 
Three questions tested respondents’ knowledge of political institutions: (1) 
“Which agency in China exercises the legislative power of the State?”; (2) 
“What is the maximum number of consecutive terms that a President of the 
People’s Republic of China may serve?”; and (3) “How many incumbent 
members does the Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC Central 
Committee have?”. Three other questions assessed respondents’ knowledge 
of legal institutions: (1) “What type of organ appoints and removes the 
adjudicative personnel of the local people’s court at each level?”; (2) 
“Among the following criminal sentences, which one has to be reported to 
the Supreme People’s Court for examination and approval (expecting those 
that should be adjudicated by the Supreme People’s Court according to the 
law)?”; and (3) “Who is the incumbent president of the Supreme People’s 
Court?”.  
Data on respondents’ gender and their level of legal and political 
knowledge was recorded for two reasons. First, the criminalization of 
marital rape is a gendered issue, and people’s susceptibility to persuasion 
might depend on the strength of their existing convictions. Second, prior 
research has uncovered a significant correlation between trust in Chinese 
institutions, on the one hand, and gender and “legal and political 
information” on the other.87 Specifically, Qing Yang and Wenfang Tang 
report that “males are less trustful of legal institutions,” and that the “more 
legal and political information people have, the less likely they are to trust 
institutions.”88  
We therefore define two indicator variables—“Male” and 
“Sophistication” —for our subsequent analyses. There are 490 females and 
                                                                                                                            
CHINA: MUTUAL PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS 26, 29–30 (Douglas G. Spelman ed. 2011) 
(“[T]ighter political controls on the part of the Chinese government . . . remain serious 
constraining factors that risk severely damaging international academic collaboration and 
China’s image in the world.”). 
87 Yang & Tang, supra note 73, at 426. Although Yang and Tang report other variables 
being significantly correlated with trust in institutions, such as urban experience and 
education (beyond the primary level), we are unable to test these hypotheses here.  
88 Id. 
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316 males in the pool of respondents. The gender indicator, “Male”, is 
constructed by assigning females a value of 0 and males a value of 1. In 
addition, the number of correct answers given by each respondent to the six 
political and legal questions is summed to produce a knowledge score. The 
median of this sum is 3 and the mean, 3.3722. The distribution of 
knowledge scores is plotted in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Distribution of Political and Legal Knowledge Scores 
 
To conserve statistical power, the indicator variable, “Sophistication,” is 
constructed by assigning a value of 1 to respondents who have attained a 
score of four or higher and 0 otherwise. 
 
3. Results and Analysis 
 
All responses to the two scenarios are coded from a 1 to 9 scale: 1 
corresponds to “completely oppose,” 5 corresponds to “neither support nor 
oppose,” while 9 corresponds to “completely support.” Averages of these 
agreement scores for the control and treatment conditions in the marital rape 
scenario are summarized in Table 4 and the main and interaction effects 
between treatment conditions are estimated through an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression, presented in Table 5.89 
                                                 
89 The main and interaction effects in a factorial design are straightforwardly defined 
by the Neyman-Rubin potential outcomes model. Tirthankar Dasgupta et al., Causal 
inference from 2K factorial designs by using potential outcomes, 77 JOURNAL OF THE 
ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY SERIES B 727 (2014). For the 
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Institution Level Counterargument Average Score 
Lawyer No 6.8395 
Lawyer Yes 7.2750 
Governmental Agency National No 6.3210 
Governmental Agency National Yes 6.7778 
Governmental Agency Local No 6.4625 
Governmental Agency Local Yes 6.5823 
Court National No 6.4634 
Court National Yes 6.9877 
Court Local No 6.6667 
Court Local Yes 6.8125 
 
Table 4: Average Agreement Score for Conditions in Scenario One 
 
The regression analysis reveals no evidence of judicial organs being 
more persuasive than administrative ones, or of national entities being more 
persuasive than local ones. As can be seen from Table 5, the differences in 
                                                                                                                            
equivalence between regression-based and randomization based inference of these effects, 
see Jiannan Lu, On randomization-based and regression-based inferences for 2K factorial 
designs, 112 STATISTICS & PROBABILITY LETTERS 72 (2016). A proof of the finite 
population asymptotic normality of the OLS estimator of these effects is given in Jiannan 
Lu, Covariate adjustment in randomization-based causal inference for 2K factorial designs, 
119 STATISTICS & PROBABILITY LETTERS 11 (2016). The standard errors are estimated 
using the Huber-White sandwich estimator.  
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agreement scores between the factors, or combination of factors, are small 
and quite possibly the result of random variation.90 It appears that courts 
and public security agencies are not appreciably different in their ability to 
persuade.  
 
 Agreement Score 
Constant 6.667*** 
 (0.198) 
Administrative -0.204 
 (0.280) 
National -0.203 
 (0.279) 
Counterargument 0.146 
 (0.280) 
Administrative:National 0.062 
 (0.395) 
Administrative:Counterargument -0.026 
 (0.398) 
National:Counterargument 0.378 
 (0.395) 
Administrative:National:Counterargument -0.041 
 (0.560) 
Observations 645 
R2 0.013 
Adjusted R2 0.003 
                                                 
90 The significance tests rely on the asymptotic normality of the OLS estimator. As a 
robustness check, we have also performed nonparametric ANOVA on aligned rank 
transformed data, and obtained similar qualitative results. 
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Note: *p<0.05   **p<0.01   ***p<0.001 
Table 5: OLS Regression of Agreement Score in Scenario One on Factors, Excluding Controls. 
Robust Standard Error in Parentheses. 
To examine whether courts and agencies are in fact more persuasive 
than non-judicial or administrative actors, we compare them against the 
lawyer quoted in the control conditions (Table 6). Relative to the lawyer, 
courts and, especially, public security agencies are able to induce a greater 
amount of attitudinal change.91 Specifically, the baseline model (which does 
not take into account any of the covariates) estimates that attributing the 
argument opposing the criminalization of marital rape to a court or an 
agency, rather than a legal practitioner, reduces the average support for the 
reform by 0.324 and 0.520 respectively on a 9-point scale. These results 
remain largely true92 even after we make covariate adjustments for gender 
and knowledge.93 Although greater legal and political knowledge does not 
appear to vitiate the influence of an institutional endorsement, there is some 
support for Yang & Tang’s finding that “males are less trustful of legal 
institutions.”94 
 
 Agreement Score 
Constant 7.056*** 7.056*** 7.388*** 7.381*** 
 (0.138) (0.158) (0.170) (0.188) 
Judicial -0.324* -0.292 -0.497** -0.548** 
 (0.169) (0.191) (0.210) (0.230) 
                                                 
91 As a robustness check, we performed the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test, and reject 
the null hypothesis of identical means across lawyer, courts, and public security agencies 
conditions at conventional levels of significance (p-value=0.007127). A follow-on pair-
wise Wilcoxon rank sum test that uses the Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple 
hypothesis testing yields the same qualitative results, except that the difference in means 
between the lawyer and the courts no longer attains conventional levels of significance 
(p=0.0915). 
92  In one specification, the coefficient for the court indicator does not reach 
conventional levels of significance (p-value=0.1061). However, this specification is 
unlikely to be a good fit for the data because the knowledge covariate seems to contribute 
very little to an explanation of the variance in the dependent variable. In any case, it is 
fairest to say, given the outcomes of the non-parametric tests, that our conclusions as to 
public security agencies are more robust than our findings as to courts. 
93 As might perhaps be expected, male respondents were more likely to oppose the 
criminalization of marital rape than female respondents independent of their assignment to 
any of the treatment or control conditions.  
94 Yang & Tang, supra note 73, at 426. 
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Administrative -0.520*** -0.475** -0.565*** -0.552** 
 (0.169) (0.191) (0.211) (0.230) 
Sophistication  -0.002  0.040 
  (0.329)  (0.439) 
Judicial:Sophistication  -0.191  0.527 
  (0.418)  (0.599) 
Administrative:Sophistication  -0.252  -0.087 
  (0.416)  (0.583) 
Male   -0.923*** -1.006*** 
   (0.283) (0.332) 
Judicial:Male   0.523 0.811** 
   (0.344) (0.399) 
Administrative:Male   0.201 0.306 
   (0.345) (0.400) 
Sophistication:Male    0.252 
    (0.658) 
Judicial: Sophistication:Male    -1.345 
    (0.845) 
Administrative: Sophistication:Male    -0.305 
    (0.835) 
Observations 806 806 806 806 
R2 0.012 0.014 0.045 0.051 
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.007 0.039 0.038 
Note: *p<0.05   ** p<0.01   ***p<0.001 
Table 6:  OLS Regression of Agreement Score in Scenario One on Factors and Covariates , 
Including Controls. Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses.  
 
28 DRAFT [17-Dec-19 
We repeat the same analyses for the freedom of speech scenario. 
Averages of the agreement scores for the control and treatment conditions 
in this second scenario are summarized in Table 7 and the main and 
interaction effects between treatment conditions are estimated through an 
OLS regression, presented in Table 8.  
 
Institution Level Counterargument Average Score 
State Media No 5.4735 
State Media Yes 5.0500 
Governmental Agency National No 5.3086 
Governmental Agency National Yes 5.6830 
Governmental Agency Local No 5.3951 
Governmental Agency Local Yes 5.5732 
Court National No 5.4198 
Court National Yes 5.4375 
Court Local No 5.5000 
Court Local Yes 5.6296 
Table 7: Average Agreement Score for Conditions in Scenario Two 
 
Like in the first scenario, there is no evidence that judicial organs are 
more persuasive than administrative ones. There is also no evidence that 
national entities are more persuasive than local ones. Overall, no significant 
differences in agreement score were detected between any factor—or 
combination of factors—across the treatment conditions (Table 8).95 The 
null hypothesis that courts and governmental agencies are similar in their 
ability to persuade cannot be rejected. 
 
 Agreement Score 
                                                 
95 As before, we performed nonparametric ANOVA on aligned rank transformed data, 
and obtained similar qualitative results. 
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Constant 6.705*** 
 (0.197) 
Judicial -0.372 
 (0.276) 
National 0.171 
 (0.276) 
Counterargument -0.199 
 (0.276) 
Judicial:National 0.125 
 (0.388) 
National:Counterargument 0.756 
 (0.388) 
National:Counterargument 0.122 
 (0.389) 
Judicial:National:Counterargument -0.394 
 (0.547) 
Observations 646 
R2 0.012 
Adjusted R2 0.002 
Note: *p<0.05   **p<0.01   ***p<0.001 
Table 8: OLS Regression of Agreement Score in Scenario Two on Factors, Excluding 
Controls. Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
 
To see if these institutions are in fact more persuasive than non-
regulatory actors, we once again compare courts and PPRFT agencies to 
Xinhua News Agency whose editorial is used in the control conditions. 
True to our expectations, the former do not have a noticeable edge over the 
latter in inducing attitudinal change (Table 9).96 There are no indications 
that treatment effects might vary by knowledge or gender.  
 
 Agreement Score 
                                                 
96 The Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test is unable to reject the null hypothesis of identical 
means across lawyer, courts, and PPRFT agencies conditions at conventional levels of 
significance (p-value=0.3655).  
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Constant 5.244*** 5.271*** 5.362*** 5.319*** 
 (0.139) (0.155) (0.172) (0.185) 
Judicial 0.253 0.262 0.064 0.150 
 (0.171) (0.190) (0.213) (0.231) 
Administrative 0.247 0.193 0.022 0.058 
 (0.170) (0.189) (0.214) (0.228) 
Sophistication  -0.142  0.324 
  (0.353)  (0.507) 
Judicial:Sophistication  -0.046  -0.581 
  (0.433)  (0.609) 
Administrative:Sophistication  0.288  -0.235 
  (0.435)  (0.695) 
Male   -0.344 -0.161 
   (0.293) (0.341) 
Judicial:Male   0.526 0.331 
   (0.356) (0.410) 
Administrative:Male   (0.354) (0.410) 
    -0.776 
Sophistication:Male    (0.723) 
    0.894 
Judicial:Sophistication:Male    (0.884) 
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    0.715 
Administrative:Sophistication:Male    (0.924) 
Observations 806 806 806 806 
R2 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.010 
Adjusted R2 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 
Note: *p<0.05   ** p<0.01   ***p<0.001 
Table 9: OLS Regression of Agreement Score in Scenario Two on Factors and Covariates, 
Including Controls. Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
Taking the two experimental scenarios together, it appears that Chinese 
judicial and administrative institutions are able to legitimize policy, but only 
if the issues or arguments are non-ideological in nature. Moreover, courts 
do not seem to be more persuasive than governmental agencies. Care must 
be exercised in generalizing these findings since our subject pool is 
comprised entirely of university students. Nevertheless, the qualitative 
conclusions reached here might well extent to the Chinese population 
despite the unrepresentativeness of the sample. Citizens who are younger 
and more educated are likely to be more skeptical of governmental 
institutions.97 To the extent that trust moderates the persuasiveness of state 
institutions, the phenomena documented by the survey experiment should 
be amplified in the overall population. To the best of our knowledge, there 
is no theoretical or empirical basis for believing that compared to the 
average citizen, university students systemically repose more trust in 
judicial rather than administrative institutions, or vice versa. It is therefore 
not unreasonable to extrapolate our findings to the population as a whole—
at least until better data comes along. 
 
IV. THE FUTURE OF JUDICIALIZATION IN CHINA 
 
A.  The Political Economy of Chinese Institutions 
 
                                                 
97  Dahai Zhao & Wei Hu, Determinants of public trust in government: empirical 
evidence from urban China, 83 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES 
358, 366 (2017) (reporting results from a digit-dialled telephone survey of adult 
respondents in 34 Chinese metropolitan cities); Lianjiang Li, Political Trust in Rural 
China, 30 MODERN CHINA 228, 236 (2004) (reporting results from face-to-face interviews 
with adult respondents in four counties). 
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As Benjamin Liebman mused,  
 
Many in the West and in China have looked to China’s courts in 
the hope that they may play a transformative role in the Chinese 
political system. But the more pertinent question may be what role 
courts can play within the current system. Can they serve as fair 
adjudicators of private disputes, and as checks on some forms of 
official action, without political change? And if they do, will they 
legitimize Party rule, or will the development of a more 
professionalized judiciary inevitably lead to courts that challenge 
Party authority?98 
 
Taking the inquiry in this direction requires an empirical assessment of the 
persuasiveness of courts relative to other state organs. The hold that judicial 
institutions have on mass opinion influences the degree of public support 
courts might expect were they to confront rival institutions.99 Moreover, the 
better courts are at legitimizing national or party directives, the more 
latitude they are likely to receive from their governmental and political 
overseers.  
 The evidence here suggests that despite their recent ascendance, 
Chinese courts are unlikely to openly defy other state organs, nor are they 
likely to assert themselves against the ruling party. Though they are 
sometimes able to induce agreement to controversial policies, they are not 
the only entities capable of doing so. Administrative bodies too can produce 
attitudinal change, perhaps to a greater extent than judicial ones. The party-
state might well cultivate a professional judiciary to police the excesses of 
local governments or to forestall social unrest through the satisfactory, if 
not always principled, resolution of large-scale disputes.100 But it does not 
rely on courts to convince the public of the rightness of its decisions. For 
matters that do not implicate party doctrine or orthodoxy, non-judicial 
endorsements seem to be as effective as judicial ones. And for issues that 
carry ideological freight, state organs, including courts, appear powerless to 
                                                 
98  Benjamin L. Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, in CHINA’S LEGAL 
SYSTEM: NEW DEVELOPMENTS, NEW CHALLENGES 66, 82 (Donald C. Clarke ed. 2008) 
99 See also Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, & Olga Shvetsova, The Role of Constitutional 
Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117 (2001) (elaborating a theory of how constitutional courts build up 
legitimacy by confining their decisions to the “tolerance interval,” that is the range of 
outcomes that are acceptable to the political branches). 
100  See Xin He, Administrative Law as a Mechanism for Political Control in 
Contemporary China, in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA (Stéphanie Balme & 
Michael W. Dowdle eds., 2009) (arguing that political and socioeconomic conditions 
explain the use or non-use of administrative law as a mechanism for monitoring and 
controlling lower-level governments). 
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change minds. 
These facts might help explain, among other things, the institutional 
design of constitutional review in China. As previously mentioned, the 
Chinese constitution provides for the NPC and its Standing Committee “to 
supervise [its] enforcement.”101 The Standing Committee has, in addition, 
the authority “to interpret the Constitution.”102 These provisions have been 
read to preclude judicial review of the constitutionality of legislative and 
administrative acts. Indeed, it has long been understood that courts are not 
permitted to resolve a conflict between the constitution and ordinary laws or 
other official documents by disregarding the latter.103 This is a task for the 
national legislature. Since 2000, constitutional regularity has been 
assured—at least nominally—through a system of “recording and 
review.” 104  Under this regime, regulations and interpretations issued by 
governmental bodies other than the NPC or its Standing Committee are sent 
to the Secretariat of the NPC Standing Committee’s General Office to be 
recorded. A small number of these documents are subject to active review 
by the NPC Standing Committee’s Legislative Affairs Commission. The 
vast majority are not given any scrutiny at all unless a concern is surfaced to 
the Commission’s attention. In theory, any citizen could submit suggestions 
for review. In practice, “private individuals have never been able to trigger 
the seemingly well-designed, albeit convoluted, review process . . . and no 
public institution has ever even bothered to try. 105  The result is the 
proliferation of unconstitutional rules and a chaotic lack of uniformity in the 
                                                 
101 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa, supra note 6, arts. 62, 67. 
102 Id. 
103 He Haibo, How Much Progress Can Legislation Bring? The 2014 Amendment of 
the Administrative Litigation Law of PRC, 13 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 137, 174 (2018) (“It is 
completely out of the question in China for courts to review the constitutionality of laws . . 
. .”). 
104 The 2000 amendment to the Legislation Law prescribes substantive and procedural 
rules regarding constitutional review. In 2004, the standing committee of the NPC set up an 
office responsible for recording and review of the constitutionality and legality of statutes 
and regulations. Xingzheng Fagui, Difangxing Fagui, Zizhi Tiaoli he Danxing Tiaoli, Jingji 
Tequ Fagui Beian Shencha Gongzuo Chengxu (The Procedure of the Work of Record and 
Review of Administrative Regulations, Local Regulations, Automony Rules, and Special 
Economic Zone Regulations) [行政法规、地方性法规、自治条例和单行条例、经济特
区法规备案审查工作程序] (promulgated by the National People’s Congress on Oct. 16, 
2000, effective on Oct. 16, 2000); Hu Jinguang, Lun Hexianxing Shencha de Guolv Jizhi, 
19 China Law Review 64, 65 (2018); Qianfan Zhang, Establishing Judicial Review in 
China, in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIA 320—22 (Albert H.Y. Chen & Andrew 
Harding eds., 2018); see also Shen Kui, Administrative “Self-Regulation” and the Rule of 
Administrative Law in China, 13 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 72, 88–92 (2018) (describing the 
“filing and check” system for reviewing the constitutionality of administrative regulations 
and local regulations.”).    
105 Zhang, supra note 104, at 322. 
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law. This state of affairs probably spurred President Xi Jinping to announce 
at the 19th National People’s Congress in October 2017 the imperative to 
“strengthen oversight to ensure compliance with the Constitution, advance 
constitutional review, and safeguard the authority of the Constitution.”106 
Now, operating through law may legitimize the party-state by giving 
it the veneer of procedural regularity. But legalization does not always 
entail judicialization, i.e. “the reliance on courts and judicial means for 
addressing core moral predicaments, public policy questions, and political 
controversies.” 107  To implement President Xi’s directive at the 19th 
National People’s Congress, the Chinese constitution was amended to 
reorganize the Law Committee of the NPC as the Constitution and Law 
Committee.108 This committee—not the courts—is responsible for ensuring 
that local legislation does not run afoul of the constitution. Academics did 
propose alternatives that contemplated greater judicial participation. A 
professor at the China Youth Institute of Political Studies, for instance, 
argued for the establishment of a special tribunal of the SPC to adjudicate 
                                                 
106 Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress, China Daily, Nov. 
4, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-
11/04/content_34115212.htm (last visited on Feb. 13, 2019). Zhu Jie, Lun Hexianxing 
Shencha de Zhengzhi Jueduan he Zhidu Tuijin – Jiyu Dang de Shijiuda Baogao de Jiedu (
论合宪性审查的政治决断和制度推进—基于党的十九大报告的解读) [The Political 
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the constitutionality of local legislation. Such a system, she claimed, would 
strengthen the authority of both the central government and the judiciary.109 
But the political calculus tells against such an idea. For the party-state, the 
benefits of having the SPC perform constitutional review are meager. The 
SPC is no more effective than other organs of state in inducing policy 
agreement and quelling social dissent. On the cost side of things, however, 
authorizing the SPC to set aside lower laws as contrary to higher ones 
loosens the grip of the NPC on subordinate legislatures. More dangerously, 
it gives the court occasion to elaborate a constitutional jurisprudence that, 
through accretion, might eventually come to regulate the party-state’s 
exercise of its powers. It is therefore not surprising that President Xi, 
though advocating conformance to the constitution, never contemplated 
judicializing constitutional review. The task of arbitrating between 
contradictory legal norms remains to this day a legislative, not judicial, 
prerogative. 
 
B.  Public Interest Litigation in China and its Possibilities 
 
The persuasiveness of the Chinese courts also bears on the promise of 
public interest litigation in achieving social change. 110  As others have 
observed, many plaintiffs broadcast their grievances in order to marshal the 
public behind their own causes. But many plaintiffs, especially those 
bringing claims implicating gender or the environment, also seek to 
challenge pernicious practices, beliefs, and norms.111 As Titi Liu describes 
it, “[t]he central motivation of [such] plaintiffs is the struggle to define 
abusive practices that had previously been tolerated by the Chinese public 
as both a legal harm and harmful to a collective public interest.”112 They 
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carry on this struggle by publicizing the particular injury they suffered, 
thereby demonstrating the systemic injustice being perpetrated on others 
like them. They also hope that a legal victory will inspire victims to stand 
up for themselves and persuade victimizers of the error of their ways. 
The employment discrimination cases are an area where the strictures of 
the law brush up against diffuse and entrenched stereotypes. Formally, the 
Women’s Rights Law states that “[w]omen shall enjoy equal rights with 
men in all aspects of political, economic, cultural, social, and family life” 
and declares “[e]quality between men and women [to be] a basic State 
Policy.”113 “The State,” the statute continues, “takes the necessary measures 
to gradually improve the systems for protecting the rights and interests of 
women, in order to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women.”114 
This law harkens back “[o]ne of the promises made by the revolutionaries 
who established the People’s Republic in 1949”: “to raise the status of 
women.” 115  “The entry of women into the labor force was deemed 
especially important because of the belief of Chinese and other Marxists 
that women’s participation was the key to the liberation of women.”116 
“Women,” according to Mao Zedong, “hold up half the sky” and 
“[w]hatever men comrades can can do, woman comrades can do.”117 The 
reality, however, falls woefully short of the rhetoric.118 Even today, women 
tend to be “perceived as fragile and more deserving to work at home, rather 
than getting advancement toward managerial positions.”119 They are paid 
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less than men, and tend to be the last to be hired and the first to be fired. 
And job advertisements continue to perpetuate stereotypes that cast women 
as physically and intellectually inferior.120  
Cao Ju v. Juren Academy,121 for instance, was a suit initiated in July 
2012 in Beijing’s Haidian District by a plaintiff who had been rejected for a 
position as an executive assistant because she was female. Plaintiff Cao 
alleged a violation of her right to obtain employment on an equal basis. The 
court temporized, establishing the case after a wait of fourteen months. At 
trial, the principal of Juren Academy formally apologized for the school’s 
policy of recruiting only men and offered Cao ￥30,000 in compensation. 
Cao accepted the offer and her case—dubbed “the first gender 
discrimination lawsuit in China”—was settled on December 18, 2013.122 At 
the affair drew to a close, Juren Academy’s principal reflected on the case’s 
“great influence in China.”123 According to him, the controversy highlighted 
the need to overhaul human resource practices and, also, for supplementary 
regulation defining and promoting gender equality in the workplace.124  For 
her part, Cao hoped that her case “will inspire other women like [her] to 
stand up for their rights.”125 
Indeed, Juren Academy spawned similar litigation attacking gender 
discrimination in China.126 Gao Xiao vs. Guangdong Huishijia Economic 
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Development Co. is illustrative. Plaintiff Gao applied for a role as a trainee 
cook at defendant’s restaurant and was told that the opening had been 
filled.127 As she later discovered, that statement was false: the position was 
subsequently re-advertised as being for “male applicants only.” 128  The 
restaurant then explained that the job was more suited to men because it was 
physically demanding.129 Dissatisfied, Gao sued the restaurant’s owner in 
Guangdong’s Haizhu District, demanding a formal apology and ¥40,800 in 
damages.130 Though the court hesitated in accepting the case, it eventually 
held that the restaurant’s hiring policies unlawful and awarded Gao for 
¥2,000 for the mental distress she suffered.131 On appeal, the Guangdong 
Intermediate People’s Court denied Gao’s request for higher damages.132 It 
did, however, order the defendant to publish an apology in a local 
newspaper.133 Interviewed at the conclusion of her lawsuit, Gao said that 
“[she] was hoping for a legal breakthrough, to send the message to everyone, 
to women, that there is such a thing as gender discrimination in today’s 
society. Recruitment should be done on the basis of ability, not gender.”134  
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Plaintiffs in Juren Academy and Guangdong Hushijia Economic 
Development Co. sought more than just compensation; they sought also to 
deploy the law—in ways tolerated if not encouraged by the party-state—to 
improve the condition of women. Such plaintiffs hope, though litigation, to 
broadcast the plight of others like themselves and, more ambitiously, to 
reform traditional values, attitudes, and beliefs. The empirical data 
presented here suggests that such litigation may produce the desired 
impression on the populace. This conclusion depends, of course, on people 
hearing about judicial decisions. Because cases revolve around personal 
stories, they are more concrete and palpable than abstract statements of law. 
Lawsuits therefore have the potential to captivate public interest. Insofar as 
they do, they are a promising medium for social change. 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
This Article presented evidence that administrative bodies in China are 
at least as persuasive as the courts and that both types of entities can 
occasionally be more effective than other actors in producing attitudinal 
change. The generality of these conclusions has to be qualified by the 
narrow range of topics addressed in the two experimental scenarios and the 
unrepresentativeness of the student respondents. Still, the results of the 
survey experiment are broadly consistent with the literature on trust in 
Chinese institutions135  and echo research demonstrating that “persuasive 
powers are not the exclusive preserve of courts.” 136  Though scant, the 
accumulated evidence on the persuasiveness of judicial institutions in 
authoritarian states indicates that courts can sometimes change minds. Yet, 
they are manifestly not the only institutions capable of doing so, casting 
doubt on the American thesis that courts are unique in their capacity to 
legitimize policy.  
Our findings also imply that the prevalence of judicial policymaking in 
China does not lie in the ability of courts to persuade. The quasi-legislative 
function of courts may, instead, be attributable to their technical and 
informational superiority over legislatures and the flexibility of judicial as 
opposed to legislative policymaking.137 The pace of social, economic, and 
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technological change therefore contributes to the “attractiveness of [courts] 
as a flexible and fast parallel lawmaker.”138 For these reasons, the judiciary 
will remain important to the articulation and implementation of 
governmental policy. But one should be slow to infer from the China’s turn 
towards legality139 that courts might in short order acquire the de factor or 
de jure power to subject the party-state itself to the demands of law. The 
judicial influence on public opinion is limited, and courts lack the 
institutional strength to challenge, much less defy, more powerful state 
organs. We should therefore expect courts in China to proceed as they have 
always done: cautiously, clandestinely, and incrementally.140  
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